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Alessandra Guariglia, Xiaoxuan Liu, and Lina Song 
 
Abstract 
Does the availability of internal finance constrain firm growth? Or does it foster it? To answer these 
questions, we use a panel of 407,096 Chinese firms over the period 2000-2005. We estimate dynamic 
assets growth equations augmented with cash flow, and find that the growth of state owned enterprises is 
not affected by cash flow, while that of privately owned firms is most affected. Considering that they 
represent 62% of the observations in our sample and that, in spite of being typically discriminated 
against by financial institutions, private firms have experienced sensational growth rates, our results 
suggest that internal finance has fostered rather than constrained their growth. 
 
JEL Classification: D92. 
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6.  Conclusions Non-Technical Summary  
Chinese firms achieved very high growth rates and generated large cash flow streams in recent years. 
Are these two features related? And if so, what is the nature of the link that connects them? Our paper 
seeks to answer these questions. 
We provide a meaningful contribution to the literature on finance and economic growth. Numerous papers 
in this literature have used macro data to investigate the links between broad measures of financial 
development and economic growth, and generally found a positive relationship. Yet, China is a 
counterexample to these findings: in spite of a malfunctioning financial system, it has one of the fastest 
growing economies. We help to rationalize this puzzle by investigating the role played by the availability of 
internally generated funds in determining firm-level growth.  
Our research also relates to the literature on financing constraints. A number of papers have recently 
analyzed the extent to which measures of internal finance (such as cash flow) affect firms’ investment in 
fixed capital, inventories, or R&D. Most of these studies interpreted a positive link between cash flow and 
investment as an indicator of financial constraints. Only a handful of papers attempted to assess the 
degree of financing constraints faced by Chinese firms. These studies are based on datasets made up of 
relatively small numbers of firms, only operating in major Chinese cities. In contrast, we use a very large 
dataset made up of 407,096 unlisted firms, over the period 2000-2005. Moreover, instead of only 
concentrating on the links between cash flow and investment, we focus on the growth of firms’ total 
assets, which encompasses all possible uses of cash flow.  
We find that the growth of state owned enterprises (SOEs) is not affected by cash flow, while that of 
collective and private firms is most affected. Our results are robust to accounting for investment 
opportunities in several ways, to considering assets growth net of cash, to defining our ownership 
categories in different ways, and to estimating an extended growth model. They suggest that SOEs are 
not subject to financing constraints, probably because they experience soft budget constraints. In 
contrast, private and collective firms are the most financially constrained, being typically discriminated 
against by the banking sector. 
Considering that private firms make up on average about 62% of the observations in our sample, the 
Chinese miracle, which was driven by these firms, may have been made possible by their ability to 
generate vast amounts of internal funds, which enabled them to grow, in spite of their inability to obtain 
external finance. For these firms, growth may therefore have been fostered rather than constrained by the 
availability of internal finance.  
Yet, if the competitive advantage of these firms were to be eroded, lowering their ability to generate 
internal funds, financial constraints would become increasingly binding for these firms. This could cause a 
significant reduction in economic growth. Thus, to make sure that the Chinese economy continues to 
thrive, measures will have to be taken ensuring a more widespread access to institutional finance. 
 
 1. Introduction 
Over the period 2000-2005, Chinese firms achieved very high growth rates and 
generated large cash flow streams: their average assets growth was 8.0% and their 
average cash flow to capital ratio, 40.4%
1. Are these two features related? And if so, 
what is the nature of the link that connects them? Our paper seeks to answer these 
questions. 
We provide a meaningful contribution to the literature on finance and 
economic growth. Numerous papers in this literature have used macro data to 
investigate the links between broad measures of financial development and growth, 
and generally found a positive relationship (see Levine, 2005, for a survey). Yet, 
China is a counterexample to these findings: in spite of a malfunctioning financial 
system, it has one of the fastest growing economies (Allen at al., 2005). The present 
paper helps to rationalize this puzzle (which we denote hereafter as the Chinese 
growth puzzle) by investigating the role played by the availability of internally 
generated funds in determining firm-level growth
2.  
Our research also relates to the literature on financing constraints. In recent 
years, a number of papers have analyzed the extent to which measures of internal 
finance (such as cash flow) affect firm investment in fixed capital, inventories, or 
R&D, which can be seen as specific components of firm growth. Most of these studies 
interpret a positive link between cash flow and investment as an indicator of financial 
constraints
3. A financially constrained firm, for which it is difficult or too expensive 
to obtain external finance, will in fact only invest if it has sufficient internal funds, 
and will be forced to reduce its investment, and hence its growth, following drops in 
its cash flow. Yet, these financial constraints could transform themselves into 
financial stimuli for cash flow-rich firms with good investment prospects.  
                                                 
1 These figures are obtained from our dataset, which is a large-scale enterprise survey conducted by the 
Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) over the period 2000-2005, and covering all state owned 
enterprises and other types of enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $650,000) or 
more. This dataset is thoroughly described in Section 3. 
2 To the best of our knowledge, this approach, which was pioneered in 2002 by Carpenter and Petersen 
who applied it to small US listed firms, has never been used with reference to a developing country. 
See Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) for an application to Belgium and Slovenia. Hereafter, we will use 
the terms internal finance, internally generated funds, and cash flow, interchangeably. 
3 This view (the financing constraints hypothesis) has, however, been challenged by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and Cummins et al. (2006). See Schiantarelli (1995), Hubbard (1998), 
and Bond and Van Reenen (2007), for surveys of the literature on financing constraints and firm 
behavior.   2
Given the heterogeneity that characterizes it, the Chinese economy represents 
an ideal laboratory for testing the financing constraints hypothesis. It contains in fact 
several types of firms, likely to face very different degrees of credit constraints. The 
two extreme groups are the state owned and the private enterprises. Because of their 
multi-functionality, i.e. their need to respond to both political and social stresses, as 
well as to economic objectives (Bai et al., 2006), the state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
typically experience soft budget constraints, and are able to obtain large amounts of 
loans from the banking system, despite their low profitability. These firms are 
therefore unlikely to face any financial constraints, and we do not expect their growth 
to be significantly affected by their internally generated funds. Private firms, on the 
other hand, make up the largest group, and constitute the engine of growth of the 
Chinese economy, with growth rates in excess of 10%. Yet, these firms are typically 
discriminated against in terms of access to external funding (Allen et al., 2005)
4. For 
these financially constrained firms, the ability to generate high cash flow streams may 
have played a significant role in fostering their spectacular growth rates. 
Despite China being a very interesting case study, only a handful of papers 
attempted to test whether the financing constraints hypothesis holds for Chinese firms 
(Chow and Fung, 1998, 2000; Héricourt and Poncet, 2007). These studies are based 
on datasets made up of relatively small numbers of firms, only operating in major 
Chinese cities. We contribute to this literature in two important ways. First, we use a 
very large and relatively unexplored dataset, conducted by the Chinese NBS over the 
period 2000-2005, and made up of 407,096 unlisted manufacturing and mining firms, 
which sum up to 1,057,999 observations. This dataset includes a large proportion of 
small and young firms, which are particularly likely to suffer from liquidity 
constraints. It provides us with a unique opportunity to carry out much sharper tests of 
the financing constraints hypothesis than those typically performed in the literature, 
which are mostly based on samples of relatively healthy listed US or UK firms
5. To 
                                                 
4 Until 1998, state owned commercial banks were instructed to lend only to state owned enterprises. 
The system was liberalized at the end of 1990s, when the Chinese Constitution acknowledged the 
private sector to be an integral part of the economy, and theoretically it is not in place any more. 
However, in practice, banks still consider private enterprises to be riskier than their public peers due to 
their short credit history and lower chance of being bailed out by the government. Evidence for this is 
given in World Bank (2003), which documents that over the period 1997-2000, only 12% of the 
working capital of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (which are mainly private) came from 
bank loans. 
5 Most of the studies based on US data make use of Compustat, while studies based on the UK make 
use of Datastream. Only a few papers in the literature have tested the financing constraints hypothesis   3
the best of our knowledge, the financing constraints hypothesis has never been tested 
using such a comprehensive dataset. Second, unlike Chow and Fung (1998, 2000) and 
Héricourt and Poncet (2007), who concentrate on firms’ investment, we focus on the 
growth of firms’ total assets, which encompasses all possible uses of cash flow. 
Hence, for financially constrained firms, we predict a relationship between internal 
finance and growth of the order of one-for-one.  
We find that the growth of SOEs is not affected by the availability of cash 
flow, while that of foreign firms is moderately affected, and that of collective and 
private firms is most affected. These results are robust to accounting for investment 
opportunities in several ways, to considering assets growth net of cash, to defining our 
ownership categories in different ways, and to estimating an extended growth model. 
They suggest that SOEs are not subject to financing constraints, probably because of 
their multi-functionality, which guarantees them unlimited loans from the state banks. 
In contrast, foreign owned firms are financially constrained, although to a moderate 
degree, as they are also able to obtain funding from their parent company (Desai et al., 
2004). Private and collective firms are the most financially constrained, being 
typically discriminated against by the banking sector.  
Considering that private firms make up on average about 62% of the 
observations in our sample, the Chinese miracle, which was driven by these firms, 
may have been made possible by their ability to generate vast amounts of internal 
funds, which enabled them to grow, in spite of their inability to obtain external 
finance. For these firms, growth may therefore have been fostered rather than 
constrained by the availability of internal finance. Yet, if the competitive advantage of 
these firms were to be eroded
6, lowering their ability to generate internal funds, their 
financing constraints could become binding. This could cause a significant reduction 
in economic growth. Thus, to make sure that the Chinese economy continues to 
thrive, measures will have to be taken ensuring a more widespread access to 
institutional finance. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
links between finance and growth in China, both from a macro and a micro 
perspective. Section 3 describes our dataset and presents some descriptive statistics. 
                                                                                                                                            
using panels containing unlisted firms (see for instance Benito, 2005, and Guariglia, 2008), but their 
datasets are generally much smaller than ours. 
6 This could happen, for instance, as a consequence of rising labor costs, or more in general, as a 
consequence of increasing competition.   4
Section 4 illustrates our baseline specification and estimation methodology. Section 5 
describes our econometric results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Links between finance and growth in China 
 
2.1  A macro perspective 
A number of studies have used provincial level panel data, over different time periods 
ranging between 1985 and 2003, to analyze the relationship between finance and 
growth in China, in an attempt to understand the Chinese growth puzzle. Among 
these, Liu and Li (2001) argue that the growth of national bank loans and self-raised 
funds are both positively related to the growth of provincial output. Similarly, Cheng 
and Degryse (2006) show that banking development spurs growth in China. Yet, Chen 
(2006) finds that Chinese growth has been fostered by the substitution of loans for 
state budget appropriation, but not by loan expansion itself, while Aziz and Duenwald 
(2002) find no evidence that bank lending boosts growth in Chinese provinces. 
Boyreau-Debray (2003) shows that credit extended by the banking sector has a 
negative impact on growth, which she attributes to the burden of supporting the state 
owned corporate sector. Finally, Guariglia and Poncet (2008) find that traditionally 
used indicators of financial development and China-specific indicators measuring the 
level of state interventionism in finance are generally negatively associated with 
growth. These effects have been gradually declining over time, and are weaker for 
high FDI recipients, suggesting that recent banking reforms have been successful, and 
that FDI may be used to alleviate the costs associated with the inefficient banking 
sector. These studies make use of different financial indicators, and different 
econometric techniques, and focus on different time periods, which might explain 
their mixed results. Yet, provincial data do not permit a full understanding of the 
relationship between finance and growth in China, as they ignore the considerable 
heterogeneity characterizing individual Chinese firms. Studies based on micro data 
are therefore necessary for this purpose.  
 
2.2  A micro perspective 
Other studies have adopted a micro perspective and use firm-level data to understand 
the links between finance and growth in China. Among these, a group of papers have 
looked at the links between specific sources of external finance and firm growth;   5
another at the links between cash flow and investment in fixed capital (which is a 
significant component of firm growth).  
Within the first group, Ayyagari et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2007) focus on 
firm-level data to explain the high growth rates experienced in China, in spite of a 
poorly developed financial system. The former rely on the World Bank Investment 
Climate Survey dataset, which covers 2400 Chinese firms across 18 different cities, 
over the period 2000-2003. The authors analyze firm financing patterns, and show 
that a relatively small percentage of firms in their sample use formal bank finance, 
while reliance on informal finance is much stronger. They then question whether it is 
non-standard financing mechanisms that promote growth in China, but are unable to 
find conclusive evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Cull et al. (2007), on the other 
hand, use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with 
the NBS to investigate whether trade credit could have been what financed China’s 
spectacular growth, in spite of its malfunctioning financial system. They conclude that 
trade credit did not play a significant role in explaining China’s growth
7. Neither of 
these studies provides therefore a solution to the Chinese growth puzzle.  
Among the second group of papers, Chow and Fung (1998) study the 
relationship between investment and cash flow using a panel of 5825 manufacturing 
firms operating in Shanghai over the period 1989-1992, with the objective of testing 
the financing constraints hypothesis. They find that firms’ investment is constrained 
by cash flow, and that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is highest for private 
firms and lowest for foreign owned firms. State owned and collective firms also 
exhibit positive sensitivities, higher for the former. Chow and Fung (2000) exploit the 
same data set as Chow and Fung (1998) and, focusing once again on investment 
equations, show that small firms exhibit lower sensitivities of investment to cash flow 
than large firms. They explain this finding considering that small firms are dominated 
by non-state, fast growing enterprises, which may be using their working capital to 
smooth their fixed investment. These studies suggest that as cash flow plays an 
important role in determining firm investment, it is also likely to affect firm growth
8. 
                                                 
7 Allen et al. (2008a) reach a similar conclusion in a recent study of the financial system capacities of 
China and India. 
8 Also see Héricourt and Poncet (2007) who, using World Bank Investment Climate Survey data, show 
that, contrary to state owned firms, private firms’ investment is strongly affected by their coverage ratio 
and debt to assets ratio.   6
We provide a synthesis between these two groups of studies. Our paper connects 
with Ayyagari et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2007), in the sense that it also uses firm-
level data to analyze firm growth. Yet, instead of focusing on the actual links between 
growth and specific sources of external finance, it follows the approach of the 
investment literature by assessing the extent to which firm growth is affected by the 
availability of internal finance (proxied by cash flow). As in the investment literature, 
a strong dependence of assets growth on cash flow can be seen as an indicator of 
financing constraints. If, following a decline in its internal funds, a firm is forced to 
reduce its growth (by reducing, for instance, its investment in fixed capital and/or 
working capital), one can infer that the firm finds it difficult to access external 
finance.  
Yet, these financial constraints could be accompanied by increasing growth rates 
for firms with good investment prospects, able to generate large amounts of internal 
funds. This could have been the case for Chinese private firms and could explain why, 
in spite of a malfunctioning financial system, China has one of the fastest growing 
economies, and can be seen as a counterexample to the findings of the finance-growth 
literature (Allen et al., 2005). The Chinese miracle could in fact have been driven by 
highly profitable private firms, which were able to finance high growth levels only 
through their retained earnings. Thus, internal finance may have fostered rather than 
constrained their growth. In the remaining part of the paper, we formally test whether 
this has been the case. 
 
3.  Data and summary statistics 
 
3.1 Data 
We use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with 
the NBS over the period 2000-2005. All state-owned enterprises and other types of 
enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $650,000) or more are 
covered. These firms operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and come from 
31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities
9. We dropped observations with 
negative sales; as well as observations with negative total assets minus total fixed 
                                                 
9 China is administratively decomposed into 31 provincial units, which fall into three categories: 22 
provinces or sheng; 4 autonomous regions or zizhiqu (Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia and 
Guangxi); and 4 municipal cities or zhixiashi, under direct supervision of the central power (Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Beijing, and, since 1997, Chongqing).   7
assets; total assets minus liquid assets; and accumulated depreciation minus current 
depreciation. Firms that did not have complete records on our main regression 
variables were also dropped. Finally, to control for the potential influence of outliers, 
we excluded observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. 
Our final dataset covers 407,096 mainly unlisted firms, which corresponds to 
1,057,999 firm-year observations
10. Our panel is unbalanced, with number of 
observations ranging from a minimum of 130,306 in 2000 to a maximum of 233,727 
in 2004
11. 
  The NBS data contains a continuous measure of ownership, which is based on 
the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by six different types of investors, namely 
the state; foreign investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and 
collective investors. The rationale for dividing foreign investors into those from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and those from other parts of the world is that the former 
capture the so-called “round-tripping” foreign direct investment, whereby domestic 
firms may register as foreign invested firms from nearby regions to take advantage of 
the benefits (such as tax and legal benefits) granted to foreign invested firms (Huang, 
2003). Ownership by legal persons is a mixture of ownership by state legal persons 
and private legal persons
12, which represents a form of corporate ownership. Finally, 
collective firms are typically owned collectively by communities in urban or rural 
areas (the latter are known as Township and Village Enterprises or TVEs). 
We grouped all foreign owned firms (from Hong-Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and 
other parts of the world) into a single category (which we labelled foreign); and all 
firms owned by legal entities, and individuals into a single category (labelled 
private)
13. Following Cull et al. (2007), we then classified our firms into state owned, 
                                                 
10 The Chinese NBS dataset does not allow separate identification of publicly listed companies in 
China. Specifically, it is difficult to track these companies as their legal identification numbers were 
changed as they went public (Liu and Xiao, 2004). Over the period considered, there were slightly 
more than 1000 listed companies operating in the manufacturing and mining sectors. This amounts to 
less than 0.3% of the total number of firms in our sample. 
11 See the Appendix for details about the structure of our panel and complete definitions of all variables 
used. 
12 Legal persons represent a mix of various domestic institutions, such as industrial enterprises, 
construction and real estate development companies, transportation and power companies, securities 
companies, trust and investment companies, foundations and funds, banks, technology and research 
institutions etc. 
13 Within this category, firms owned by individuals represent 69% of the total. As firms owned by legal 
persons include firms owned by state legal persons, one could question their inclusion in the private 
category. One reason for including them is that while the state’s primary interest is mainly political (i.e.   8
foreign, private, and collective, based on the shares of paid-in-capital contributed by 
our four types of investors over the period 2000-2005. Specifically, we classified 
firms according to their largest ownership share. For instance, if in a given year, the 
share of a firm’s capital owned by foreign investors is 40%, while the state and 
private investors each own (on average) 30% of the firm’s capital, then the firm is 
classified as foreign
14.  
  Table 1 presents the distribution of our observations by ownership type and 
year. We can see that the composition of our sample underwent considerable changes 
over the period 2000-2005. In particular, the share of the sample comprised by SOEs 
has declined from 21.37% in 2000 to just 4.34% in 2005, while the share comprised 
by private investors has increased from 41.48% to 73.53% over the same period, as a 
consequence of an ongoing process of privatization
15. The share of collectively owned 
firms also suffered a significant decline, from 24.10% to 6.33%. Collective enterprises 
have been extremely successful in the 1980s, and were typically granted tax 
advantages and easy bank loans (Byrd and Lin, 1990). Yet, in the 1990s, due to the 
increased competition by private firms and to the banking reforms, whereby banks 
started to scrutinize loan applications more carefully, these enterprises experienced 
declining profitability, and a slowdown in their growth. Reforming their ownership 
structure became a priority to reverse these trends (Song, 1990; Ho et al., 2003). 
Abraham et al. (2007) document that these firms can nowadays be considered as fully 
private. Given their different past, we, however, leave them as a separate category. 
Finally, the share comprised by foreign investors rose only moderately (from 12.22% 
to 15.38%) between 2000 and 2005. 
  As our objective in this paper is not the study of the effects of firms’ 
transitions from state owned to private or foreign on the degree of financing 
constraints that they face, in our subsequent analysis, we make use of time-invariant 
                                                                                                                                            
aimed at maintaining employment levels or control over certain strategic industries), legal persons are 
profit-oriented (Wei et al., 2005). Since our dataset does not allow us to discriminate between state and 
non-state legal persons, we were unable to exclude the former from our private category. All our results 
were, however, robust to excluding all firms owned by legal persons from the private category.  
14 We derived ownership categories on the basis of the fraction of capital paid in by the various groups, 
rather than using registration codes. Registration codes are in fact not entirely reliable, as they are 
updated only with considerable delay (Dollar and Wei, 2007). Moreover, firms might have an incentive 
to falsely register as foreign simply to take advantage of the tax benefits accorded to the latter. All our 
results were robust to using registration-based ownership categories. 
15 In the first part of its transition, China was dominated by SOEs. After 1993, due both to the 
restructuring of ownership of SOEs and to the entry of new private firms in the market, the share of 
SOEs in the economy gradually declined, while that of private companies kept rising (Jefferson and 
Jian, 2006).   9
measures of ownership. Hence, we classify firms into our four ownership categories, 




3.2 Summary  statistics 
In our empirical analysis, we focus on firm-level, growth defined as the growth of 
firms’ total assets. Total assets include tangible fixed assets; intangible fixed assets; 
other fixed assets; accounts receivable; inventories; and other current assets (the main 
component of which is cash and equivalents). Table 2 shows the composition of total 
assets by ownership types. The share of the total assets of SOEs made up by tangibles 
(42.44%) is much higher than the corresponding average share for the other three 
ownership groups (34.51%). This can be explained by the overinvestment behavior 
that typically characterizes Chinese SOEs (Qin and Song, 2008). SOEs also have 
lower shares of accounts receivable and inventories: 12.60% and 17.14%, compared 
to averages of 19.28% and 19.64% for the other groups. This suggests that, compared 
to other ownership types, SOEs are fairly different in terms of assets composition. 
  Table 3 presents sample means for a number of variables for our four 
ownership types. Once again, we see that SOEs are notably different from the other 
groups. Specifically, they exhibit very low growth rates: their mean assets growth is 
0.60%, compared to an average of 9.08% for the other three groups; their average 
sales growth is 0.84%, compared to an average of 11.40% for the rest of the sample; 
and their average employment growth rate is negative (-8.09%, compared to 2.56% 
for the other groups). These low growth rates may reflect the fact that SOEs respond 
to social and political needs, as well as to economic objectives (Bai et al., 2006). 
SOEs are typically larger (in terms of assets and number of employees) and older than 
other groups: they employ an average of 347.42 employees, compared to 200.82 for 
the rest of the sample; their total assets are worth 390.50 (thousands of yuan) 
compared to 203.67 for the other three groups; and their average age is 24.71, 
compared to 7.82 for the rest of the sample. SOEs also display very low levels of cash 
flow, and high levels of leverage: their cash flow to assets ratio is 2.44%, compared to 
8.69% for the other groups; their cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio is 11.6% 
                                                 
16 Using time-invariant measures of ownership also allows to minimize the effects of measurement 
error in the ownership variables.    10
compared to 43.45% for the rest of the sample
17; and their total leverage to total assets 
ratio is 68.92%, compared to 56.51% for the other groups
18. Finally, SOEs display a 
very low level of labor productivity (measured as the ratio of sales to total number of 
employees): 66.85% compared to 139.66% for the rest of the sample. 
As for foreign firms, they are large (employing 278.48 people), and very 
young (their average age being 6.35 years). Compared to the other ownership 
categories, they display the highest levels of labor productivity (165.76%), and the 
lowest ratio of leverage to total assets (48.68%).  
Despite being typically the smallest of the four groups in terms of average 
number of employees (180.8), private firms exhibit the highest average assets growth 
and sales growth rates, respectively 10.74% and 13.06%. They also exhibit the second 
highest cash flow to assets ratio (8.73%). This figure is much higher compared to the 
corresponding figure reported by Carpenter and Petersen (2002) for US small listed 
firms (6.2%). 
It is interesting to note from Table 3 that the percentage of firm-years that 
export is highest for foreign firms (67.33%) and lowest for SOEs (12.14%) and 
collective firms (14.86%). Furthermore, the foreign, private, and collective firms, all 
exhibit a cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio in excess of 40%. This figure is very 
high compared to corresponding figures registered for the US or Europe. For instance, 
Bond et al. (2003) report cash flow to capital ratios of 13.4% for the UK; 17.8% for 
Belgium; 11.9%, for France; and 16%, for Germany. Similarly, Cummins et al. (2006) 
report a ratio of 19% for US firms. The high cash flow to capital ratios displayed by 
Chinese non-state firms suggest that these firms have the ability to generate high 
profits. Also considering the high growth characterizing foreign and private firms, one 
could question whether these two factors are linked, i.e. whether it is actually the 
ability to generate high profits that makes it possible for Chinese firms to grow at such 
high rates. 
                                                 
17 As cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation, one could question whether these data could 
be biased due to firms’ tendency to misreport profits. Liu and Xiao (2004) document that it is mainly 
private and collective firms, and not SOEs, which have the highest propensity to disguise profits. 
Hence, the rankings of the cash flow to asses ratios reported in Table 3 would not change taking this 
under-reporting into account. Considering that it is reasonable to assume that measurement error due to 
mis-reporting of profits is time-invariant, in our regressions, we account for it in the vi component of 
the error term of our estimating equations (see section 4.1). 
18 Leverage is defined as current plus non-current liabilities over total assets. This measure includes 
borrowing from banks as well as accounts payable, which represent short term financing provided by 
suppliers.    11
  In the sections that follow, we estimate firm-level assets growth equations 
augmented with cash flow, for our four categories of firms, to formally assess the 
extent to which the growth of firms in each of the categories is affected by the 
availability of internal finance. 
 
4.  Empirical specifications and estimation methodology 
 
4.1 Baseline  model 




(Assets growth)it = a0(Assets growth)i(t-1) + a1(Cash flow/total assets)it+ vi+ vt+ eit, (1) 
 
where the subscript i identifies firms, and the subscript t, time. The error term in 
Equation (1) comprises three components: vi,  vt,  and  eit.  vi is a firm-specific 
component, encompassing all time-invariant firm characteristics likely to influence 
growth, as well as the time-invariant component of the measurement error affecting 
any of the regression variables. vt is a time-specific component accounting for 
possible business cycle effects, and eit, an idiosyncratic component. We control for vi 
by estimating our equation in first-differences and for vt by including time dummies in 
all our specifications. We estimate Equation (1) separately for the four ownership 
groups
20. 
As discussed in Carpenter and Petersen (2002), in the presence of capital 
market imperfections, one should expect the coefficient a1 to be slightly greater than 
one for those firms more likely to face financial constraints. This is because for these 
firms, external finance is typically more expensive than internal finance. Thus, should 
cash flow increase, financially constrained firms would be able to increase their assets 
                                                 
19 This specification differs from that estimated by Carpenter and Petersen (2002) in two main respects. 
First, we estimate a dynamic model, while they estimate a static one. We chose a dynamic model, as 
the static model was clearly rejected by our specification tests. Second, as Carpenter and Petersen’s 
(2002) sample is made up of listed US firm, they include Tobin’s Q as an additional regressor. As most 
of the firms in our sample are not listed, we were unable to construct Tobin’s Q, and therefore exclude 
it from our regression. Later, we will show that our results are robust to controlling for investment 
opportunities in various alternative ways. 
20 All results were robust to including cash flow divided by beginning-of-period total assets instead of 
cash flow over contemporaneous total assets. Our results were also robust to including in our regression 
the lagged cash flow to assets ratio, in addition or in alternative to the contemporaneous cash flow to 
assets ratio.   12
(which make up all possible uses of firms’ cash flow) one-for-one
21. Furthermore, as 
a higher cash flow also indicates a healthier balance sheet, firms that benefit from a 
higher cash flow are also likely to find it easier to obtain loans. Thus, in the presence 
of an increase in cash flow, firms more likely to face financing constraints will be able 
to increase their total assets slightly more than one-for-one, due to this leverage effect. 
On the other hand, financially healthy firms can always access external finance: 
changes in their internal finance should therefore only have a moderate effect or no 
effect at all on their growth. 
Figure 1 illustrates this argument
22. The horizontal axis measures cash flow 
(CF) and the change in assets (ΔTA), and the vertical axis measures the cost of 
finance. S  denotes the supply of finance. The horizontal portion of this schedule 
reflects a situation in which internal finance (CF) is used and priced at a constant 
shadow cost R. Once internal finance is exhausted, the firm must obtain loans, the cost 
of which increases the higher the loan asked for: this is reflected by the upward 
sloping portion of the S curve
23. Once the firm has borrowed from banks up to a 
certain threshold, it will make use of alternative sources of finance. These include 
mainly accounts payable, but could also contain corporate bonds, commercial paper, 
loans from insurance and financial companies and other forms of market finance. For 
simplicity, we assume that these alternative sources of finance are more expensive 
than bank loans, and that their cost is constant (Petersen and Rajan, 1994)
24. The 
threshold on bank borrowing can be determined either by credit rationing or by the 
cost of bank borrowing becoming prohibitive. Firms with unlimited access to bank 
credit should, in theory, never make use of the more expensive sources of finance. 
The IO schedule represents the firm’s investment opportunities. If cash flow rises 
from CF to CF’, then the horizontal portion of the S curve becomes longer, and, if the 
IO curve intersects the S curve in its upward sloping portion, ΔA rises to ΔA’. 
                                                 
21 In theory, it is also possible for firms to use part of their cash flow to pay off debts. In this case, the 
coefficient associated with cash flow could drop below one, even in the presence of liquidity 
constraints. 
22 This Figure is adapted from Carpenter and Petersen (2002). 
23 The more leveraged a firm is, the more incentives it will have to undertake more risky investment 
projects: this moral hazard situation explains why the supply of funds schedule is increasing once the 
firm has exhausted its internal funds (Hubbard, 1998). 
24 Contrary to Carpenter and Petersen (2002), our Figure 1 does not interpret the upper horizontal 
portion of the S curve as equity issuance. This is because our sample consists mainly of unlisted firms, 
and to the fact that equity markets are still poorly developed in China. See Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
for a discussion of why it is reasonable to assume that accounts payable are more expensive than bank 
loans. As for market finance, it typically involves a higher degree of informational asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders than bank lending, and can hence be considered as more expensive.   13
Moreover, due to the increase in net worth from which the firm benefits, the upward 
portion of the S curve becomes slightly flatter. This implies that, in the presence of 
financing constraints, a given increase in cash flow may be associated with a slightly 
more than one-for-one increase in total assets
25. This precise quantitative prediction 
allows for a sharper test of the financing constraints hypothesis than could be 
achieved simply focusing on the links between investment and cash flow
26. 
It should be noted that Figure 1 is unlikely to apply to Chinese SOEs. As 
widely documented in the literature, these firms are in fact able to receive as many 
cheap loans from the state owned banks as they need, independent on profitability 
(Boyreau-Debray, 2003). This is a consequence of their need to respond to both social 
and political stresses, as well as to economic objectives (Bai et al., 2006). The supply 
of funds schedule is therefore likely to be horizontal for SOEs, and we do not expect 
their asset growth to be significantly affected by their cash flow
27. On the other hand, 
we would expect a rise in cash flow to generate a more than one-for-one rise in total 
assets for the private and collective firms, which are typically discriminated against by 
the banking sector. As for foreign firms, the link between their cash flow and growth 
would depend on whether they make use of domestic credit markets or are financed 
by their parent company. In the former case, one could expect a more than one-to-one 
relationship, while in the latter, one would observe a cash flow coefficient either 
lower than one, or poorly determined altogether. 
  Equation (1) does not take into account investment opportunities, which are 
reflected in shifts in the IO curve in Figure 1. This could induce bias in the cash flow 
coefficient, as cash flow could be accounting for the omitted investment opportunities 
(Cummins et al., 2006; Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008). Typically, investment 
opportunities are accounted for through Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the market 
value of the firm over the replacement value of its total assets. Yet, because our 
                                                 
25 This prediction relies on the assumption that the IO schedule is highly elastic compared to the supply 
of finance. This is a reasonable assumption considering that none of the firms in our sample is 
sufficiently large to be able to affect prices by growing. 
26 It has been argued that the links between investment and cash flow observed in the literature could be 
due to the latter variable proxying for investment opportunities, rather than to financing constraints 
(Cummins et al., 2006; Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008). If this were the case, however, a slightly higher 
than one-to-one relationship between investment and cash flow would not necessarily follow. Hence, 
finding such a relationship can be seen as reliable evidence for the presence of financing constraints. 
27 Note, however, that a positive association between investment and cash flow could still be observed 
for SOEs if managers wishing to pursue private objectives overinvested relative to the optimum, by 
using ‘free cash flow’ for unprofitable investment projects (Jensen, 1986; Carpenter, 1995). In our 
empirical analysis, we never observe such a positive association.   14
sample is made up of unlisted firms, we are unable to calculate Q. We therefore 
account for investment opportunities in two alternative ways. First, we proxy them 
with the firm’s future sales growth. Sales growth has been frequently used in the 
literature to proxy for demand factors (see for instance Konings et al., 2003, and 
Hutchinson and Xavier, 2006). Second, we include in our model time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies (in addition to the aggregate time dummies). This 
approach can be seen as an indirect way to account for investment opportunities, or 
more in general demand factors, as the dummies account for all time-varying demand 
shocks at the industry level (Brown et al., 2008). If a correlation of cash flow with 
investment opportunities were an important source of bias, then the cash flow 
coefficients should decline substantially when we include future sales growth or 
industry-level time dummies in our specification. 
 
4.2 Estimation  methodology 
All equations are estimated in first-differences, to control for firm-specific, time-
invariant effects. Given possible endogeneity problems, we use a first-difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Two 
or more lags of each of the regressors are used as instruments.  
To check whether the first-difference GMM estimator is likely to suffer from 
finite sample bias, we compared the GMM and the Within Groups estimates of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in Equation (1). Because the Within 
Groups estimate is typically downward biased in short panels (Nickell, 1981), one 
would expect a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
to lie above this estimate. As our GMM coefficient was larger than its Within Groups 
counterpart, we concluded that the first-difference GMM estimates are unlikely to be 
subject to serious finite sample bias
28. 
To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly 
specified, we use two criteria: the Sargan test (also known as J test) and the test for 
second-order serial correlation of the residuals in the differenced equation (m2). If the 
model is correctly specified, the variables in the instrument set should be uncorrelated 
                                                 
28 If the estimates obtained using the first-difference GMM estimator lie close or below the Within 
Groups estimates, one could suspect the GMM estimate to be downward biased as well, possibly due to 
weak instruments. In such case, the use of a GMM system estimator (which combines in a system the 
original specification expressed in first differences and in levels) would be required (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998).   15
with the error term in the relevant equation. The J  test is the Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions, which, under the null of instrument validity, is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of instruments less the number of parameters. The m2 test is asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal under the null of no second-order serial correlation of 
the differenced residuals, and provides a further check on the specification of the 




5. Regression  results 
 
5.1 Baseline  model 
Table 4 presents estimates of Equation (1). Column 1 refers to SOEs, and columns 2 
to 4, respectively to foreign owned firms, private firms, and collective firms. 
Although small in magnitude, the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent 
variable is negative and precisely determined for all groups of firms. This can be seen 
as evidence for convergence. Except for the SOEs, the cash flow coefficient is 
positive, precisely determined, and higher than one, for all groups of firms. This 
indicates that the growth of these firms is restricted by their profit generating capacity, 
and that a higher cash flow leads to an improved net worth, making it easier for the 
firms to obtain additional loans. The cash flow coefficient is largest for privately 
owned (1.56) and collective firms (1.57), which also exhibit the largest cash flow to 
total assets ratios (respectively, 8.73% and 9.38%), and are less likely than state 
owned or foreign firms to access external finance
30. The coefficient is much smaller 
(although still larger than one) for foreign owned firms (1.11), which may also be able 
to obtain financing from their parent company (Desai et al., 2004). As for SOEs, the 
insignificant cash flow coefficient that they exhibit reflects on the one hand, their very 
low level of cash flow to total assets (2.44%), and on the other, the fact that these 
firms may still experience soft budget constraints. State owned banks typically lend to 
these firms, independently of their profitability, preventing them to go bankrupt, as 
                                                 
29 If the un-differenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order, 
but not second-order serial correlation. Note that neither the J test nor the m2 test allow to discriminate 
between bad instruments and model specification.  
30 This finding confirms the conjecture made in Abrahams et al. (2007) that collective firms can in fact 
be considered as private firms.   16
this would generate a significant social unrest (Bai et al., 2006; Boyreau-Debray, 
2003). In terms of Figure 1, this suggests that SOEs indeed face a horizontal S curve. 
Our results compare favorably with Héricourt and Poncet (2007) who, focusing on 
investment, also find that SOEs are the least financially constrained, while private 
firms are the most constrained. The Sargan test indicates some problems with the 
specification of the model and/or the validity of the instruments for private firms. Yet, 
because the m2 test is satisfactory, we do not think this to be a serious issue. 
  Table 5 presents estimates of variants of Equation (1), which also control for 
investment opportunities. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 contain the estimates of the Equation 
where demand factors are accounted for with future sales growth
31, while columns 2, 
4, 6, and 8 contain the estimates of the Equation which includes time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies. Surprisingly, from the odd columns, we can see 
that future sales growth always attracts a poorly determined coefficient. This suggests 
that sales growth may not be a good proxy for investment opportunities
32. As for the 
coefficient on cash flow, we can see that it remains poorly determined for SOEs, 
while for the other groups of firms, it remains statistically significant and larger than 
one, both in the even and in the odd columns. The cash flow coefficients for all 
groups of firms become slightly lower when investment opportunities are accounted 
for with future sales growth. Yet, when we include time dummies interacted with 
industry dummies, they remain very similar to those reported in Table 4, suggesting 
that the correlation between cash flow and investment opportunities is unlikely to be a 
significant source of bias
33. 
These results confirm our initial conjecture that Chinese firms are very 
heterogeneous in terms of their degree of dependence on internal finance. 
Specifically, SOEs are the least dependent, while private and collective firms are the 
most dependent. As for foreign firms, their cash flow coefficients suggest that they 
also face some degree of internal finance dependence. This can be seen as evidence 
that these firms cannot only finance themselves through their parent company, but 
                                                 
31 Sales growth is measured as the growth rate of real sales. Our results were robust to using the change 
in real sales as a fraction of total assets, as in Konings et al. (2003). Our results were also robust to 
including contemporaneous rather than future sales growth. 
32 For this reason, in all subsequent regressions, we will take into account investment opportunities 
including time dummies interacted with industry dummies. 
33 Between 2000 and 2005, we observe entry of new firms, and exit of existing firms from the sample. 
These decisions are potentially not random and could bias our results. All our findings were robust to 
only using a balanced panel in estimation. The results based on the balanced panel are not reported for 
brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.    17
need to also rely on the profits that they generate internally, as well as on local 
financial markets. Their reliance on local financial markets can be inferred from their 
cash flow coefficients, which are larger than one, suggesting the presence of a 
leverage effect, whereby higher cash flow is associated with the possibility of 
obtaining more leverage. 
  Considering their very high growth rates and cash flow to assets ratios, it 
seems, however, that especially for private firms, the dependence on internal finance 
has been a source of stimulus rather than a constraint. It is likely that because these 
firms have very good investment opportunities
34, and do not always have access to 
reasonably priced external finance, the higher and higher cash flows that they have 
been generating, have translated themselves into higher and higher growth rates. 
Whether there will be a limit to such growth will hence depend on whether these 
firms’ competitive advantage will be eroded. If this happened, due for instance, to 
increasing labor costs, and/or to increased competition, then private firms’ ability to 
generate profits may be reduced and cash flow could become a constraint rather than a 
stimulus to these firm’s growth. 
 
5.2 Robustness  tests 
 
Excluding cash and equivalents from total assets 
Firms’ total assets include the stock of cash and equivalents. It is possible that firms 
might absorb some of the short-run fluctuations in cash flow with cash and 
equivalents, leading to a positive relationship between changes in assets and cash 
flow, even in the absence of financing constraints (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). To 
rule out this effect, we remove the “other current assets category” from our definition 
of growth and re-estimate our Equation (1) using this alternative definition of assets 
growth
35. We account for investment opportunities by including time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies. The results are presented in Table 6. The 
coefficient on cash flow declines substantially for all firms, except the collective ones. 
This is not surprising as the dependent variable no longer captures all potential uses of 
                                                 
34 Evidence that Chinese firms face particularly good investment opportunities can be inferred from the 
fact that China is now one of the few low or low-middle income countries whose level of R&D 
intensity has risen beyond 1% (Hu and Jefferson, 2008).  
35 Our data do not allow us to separately identify cash and equivalents. These are included in the “other 
current assets category”, which also includes prepaid expenses and advances, other current assets, 
deferred charges, and short term investments.   18
internal finance. The fact that the coefficient is still precisely determined for foreign, 
private, and collective firms confirms that these firms face a certain degree of 
financial constraints.  
 
Alternative definition of ownership categories 
Table 7 presents results where firm ownership categories are defined on the basis of a 
100% of paid-in-capital rule. According to this rule, a firm is defined as privately 
owned if private agents own 100% of its capital in each of the six years making up our 
sample. Foreign owned, state owned, and collectively owned categories are defined in 
a similar way. These new categories obviously contain fewer observations than the 
previous ones, as they do not include firms that changed their ownership status over 
the period considered. Time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included 
in all specifications to control for investment opportunities. The results are once again 
similar to those reported in Table 4: growth at SOEs is not affected by internal 
finance, growth at foreign owned firms is moderately affected, and growth at private 




We next verify whether our results are robust to estimating a more general model, 
aimed at highlighting what might be other determinants of growth (see Becchetti and 
Trovato, 2002; Haeshmati, 2001; and Honjo and Harada, 2006, for a similar 
approach). In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
 
(Assets growth)it = a0(Assets growth)i(t-1) + a1(Cash flow/total assets)it +  
+ a2(Leverage/total assets)it+ a3Collateralit+ a4(Nb. of employees)it + 
+ a5(Sales/nb. of employees)it+ a6Exportit+ vi+ vt+ eit     (2) 
 
                                                 
36 Similar results were obtained when firms were classified as foreign owned, privately owned, state 
owned, or collectively owned on the basis of a 50% of paid-in-capital rule. We also tested whether the 
cash flow sensitivity of the growth of private firms with state or foreign participation below 10% 
differed from that of firms with state or foreign participation in excess of 10%, but did not find 
statistically significant differences. We therefore concluded that even if part of their capital is paid in 
by the state or foreign agents, the growth of Chinese private enterprises remains positively affected by 
their profit generating capacity. These results are not reported for brevity, but available from the 
authors upon request.   19
Our choice of regressors in Equation (2) is aimed at mirroring the regressors 
usually included in cross-country growth models. In particular, in addition to the cash 
flow to assets ratio, we include the total current and non-current liabilities to assets 
ratio, (Leverage /total assets). The effect of this variable is ambiguous: more 
leveraged firms could, on the one hand, grow faster having more resources. On the 
other hand, a higher leverage would make it more difficult for these firms to obtain 
further loans, making it harder to grow (Lang et al., 1996). This regressor is 
particularly interesting for linking our results with those obtained by macro studies on 
China’s growth. For instance, using provincial data over the period 1989-2003, 
Guariglia and Poncet (2008) show that traditionally used indicators of financial 
development, as well as China specific measures of the distortions characterizing the 
financial system (such as the proportion of total loans provided by sate-owned 
commercial banks) are negatively related with growth. However, they find that this 
relationship has become less negative, and in some cases has even become positive 
after 2000, i.e. after major reforms of the banking system were undertaken in China 
(Podpiera, 2006; Allen et al., 2008b). By including, leverage in our growth equations, 
we aim at testing at the micro level the extent to which firms owned by different 
agents employ leverage as a means of expanding their size. If loans were 
systematically allocated inefficiently towards the worst performing firms, we could 
observe a negative relationship between leverage and growth
37.  
We also include the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets (Collateral). 
We expect the latter to exert a positive effect on growth, as firms able to post higher 
collateral find it easier to obtain loans necessary to fund their investment 
opportunities. Finally, we include three non-financial variables: the number of 
employees, which is a measure of size, aimed at testing whether small firms tend to 
grow faster; a measure of labor productivity (Sales /nb. of employees); and a dummy 
equal to 1 if firm i exports at time t, and 0 otherwise (Export). We expect the latter 
two variables to positively affect growth
38.  
                                                 
37 Unfortunately, because our dataset does not contain data relative to informal finance, we were unable 
to include this information in our extended regression. This should not constitute a major source of 
bias: Ayyagari et al. (2008) document in fact that the use of informal sources of funds (defined as 
financing from informal sources such as a money lenders or informal banks) is relatively low in China 
(see Figure 2, p. 52, and Table 2, p. 57). Note that trade credit, which is often considered as a form of 
informal financing, is included within our Leverage variable. 
38 Authors like Evans (1987a, 1987b), who also focus on firm growth, show that growth also depends 
on firms’ age. As age is missing for a number of observations in our sample, we did not include it in 
our preferred regression. The regression results including age, based on a smaller sample, showed that   20
Table 8 presents the estimates of our extended model (Equation 2). Columns 1 
to 4 refer respectively to SOEs, foreign owned firms, private firms, and collective 
firms. Once again, investment opportunities are accounted for by including industry-
specific time dummies. As in the simple model, the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is negative and precisely determined for all types of firms. A 
similar pattern as in Table 4 is observed for the cash flow coefficients, which are 
statistically significant and either exactly equal to one or slightly larger than one for 
private, collective, and foreign firms, and insignificant for SOEs. The coefficient is 
now largest for the private firms (1.35), while that of collective firms is now reduced 
to exactly 1.00, suggesting that once we control for other variables, the leverage effect 
disappears for these firms. Our main result that the growth of all firms, except the 
SOEs, is affected by internal finance is therefore robust to estimating an extended 
growth model. 
As for the other financial variables, it is interesting to note that leverage plays 
a positive and significant effect on the growth of all types of firms
39. This effect is 
slightly smaller for the foreign firms, compared to the private ones, the collectives, 
and the SOEs. Our findings suggest that SOEs finance their growth mainly through 
leverage, while private firms, which display the highest assets growth rate in the 
sample, make use of both their internal funds and leverage to finance their growth. 
Collateral has a positive and precisely determined effect both for private and 
collective firms, but not for SOEs and foreign firms, which can easily obtain loans 
respectively from the banking system and their parent company. The fact that 
collateral does not affect their growth confirms our priors that SOEs experience soft 
budget constraints, whereby they can obtain loans independently on their performance 
and financial conditions.  
Although the banking system was characterized by a high degree of 
inefficiency in the first part of China’s transition, given that it channelled funds 
mainly to inefficient SOEs, our findings suggest that this problem has become less 
severe in recent years, because SOEs have become fewer, and because the banking 
system is being gradually reformed. This conclusion is in line with Guariglia and 
Poncet (2008). It is likely that once China will have established a proper social 
                                                                                                                                            
this variable was generally not precisely determined. The signs and significance of the other regressors 
were unchanged. These regressions are not reported for brevity, but are available from the authors upon 
request.  
39 These results were robust to defining leverage net of accounts payable.   21
security system, the “multitask” role of SOEs will come to an end. These firms will 
therefore either further decrease in number, or start operating on the basis of profit 
maximization, as the government, having no more incentives to keep them alive, will 
stop providing them with endless loans. The banking system will therefore be free to 
allocate financial resources to the most profitable firms. 
Except for private firms, our measure of productivity generally does not affect 
growth appreciatively. The same holds for the firm’s size measured in terms of the 
number of its employees: this variable only displays a positive and significant 
coefficient for private firms, indicating that in this group, larger firms are likely to 
exhibit faster assets growth. Surprisingly, being an exporter plays a negative and 
significant effect on the growth of private firms, but displays a poorly determined 
coefficient for other groups. 
 
6. Conclusions 
What is the final verdict on the effect of internal finance on the growth of Chinese 
firms? We have found that the growth of SOEs is not affected by the availability of 
cash flow, while that of foreign firms is moderately affected, and that of collective 
and private firms is most affected. These results are robust to accounting for 
investment opportunities in several ways, to considering assets growth net of cash, to 
defining our ownership categories in different ways, and to estimating an extended 
growth model. They suggest that SOEs are not subject to financing constraints, 
probably because of the important role they play in absorbing surplus labor and 
helping to maintain social stability, which guarantees them unlimited loans from the 
state banks. In contrast, foreign owned firms are financially constrained, although to a 
moderate degree, as they are also able to obtain funding from their parent company. 
Private and collective firms are the most financially constrained, being typically 
discriminated against by the banking sector. Yet, considering that over the period 
examined, private firms have achieved the highest growth rate among all ownership 
categories, as well as the second highest cash flow to assets ratio, we can conclude 
that for these firms, although clearly present, financial constraints were not binding: in 
fact, internal funds appear to have fostered rather than constrained private firms’ 
growth.  
Our paper complements Ayyagari et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2007), who 
found that neither informal financing, nor trade credit played an important role in   22
explaining the Chinese growth miracle, by suggesting that firms’ ability to generate 
cash flow may have been an important factor instead. As private firms represent 62% 
of the firms in our sample, their ability to generate internal finance may therefore 
represent the solution to the puzzle of why, despite a malfunctioning financial system, 
the Chinese economy has grown at stellar rates in recent years. 
Yet, if the competitive advantage of Chinese private firms were to be eroded, 
limiting their ability to generate high profits, financial constraints would quickly 
become increasingly binding for these firms, causing a significant reduction in 
economic growth. Thus, to make sure that the Chinese economy continues to thrive, 
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Appendix: Data 
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
 










1 129,608  12.25  12.25 
2 234,072  22.12  34.37 
3 160,593  15.18  49.55 
4 155,784  14.72  64.28 
5 149,540  14.13  78.41 
6 228,402  21.59  100.00 













2000 130,306  12.32  12.32 
2001 139,596  13.19  25.51 
2002 151,013  14.27  39.78 
2003 166,402  15.73  55.51 
2004 236,955  22.40  77.91 
2005 233,727  22.09  100.00 
Total  1,057,999 100.00   
 
Definitions of the variables used 
Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include 
tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and current assets 
include inventories, accounts receivable, and other current assets. 
Other current assets: sum of cash and equivalents, prepaid expenses and advances, 
other current assets, deferred charges, and short term investments. 
Cash flow: net income plus depreciation. 
Leverage: ratio of current liabilities plus non-current liabilities to total assets, where 
current liabilities include bank loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities; 
and non-current liabilities include long-term debt and other non-current liabilities. 
Collateral: ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
Sales: firm’s total sales (including domestic and overseas sales). 
Employees: total number of people employed by the firm. 
Export: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports a positive amount. 
Deflators: all variables are deflated using provincial GDP deflators, taken from 
various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook.   28
 















Note: CF= cash flow; ΔTA = change in total assets; R= constant shadow cost of internal finance; IO = 
investment opportunities schedule; O = cost of borrowing from other sources. 
Source: Adapted from Carpenter and Petersen (2002).   29

























       
2000  21.37 12.22  41.48 24.10 
2001  16.15 13.40  49.50 19.24 
2002  13.00 13.35  56.47 15.55 
2003  9.03 14.32  63.73  11.31 
2004  5.67 15.23  70.12  7.66 






















































Intangibles  2.09  2.11 2.08 1.13 
Other fixed assets  5.93  3.90 4.35 4.51 
Accounts receivable  12.60  19.19 19.20 19.44 
Inventories  17.14  20.71 18.86 19.35 
Other current assets 
 
19.81  20.66 19.83 21.15 
 
Note: All numbers in this Table are percentages.   30







































0.84  10.98 13.06 4.55 
Employment growth 
 
-8.09  5.65 2.84 -2.45 
Assets 
 
390.50 351.41 176.99 158.72 
Sales 
 
213.24 365.04 197.11 187.49 
Nb. of employees 
 
347.42 278.48 180.83 209.15 
Age 
 
24.71  6.35 7.05 14.35 
Cash flow/total assets 
 
2.44 7.98 8.73 9.38 
Cash flow/tangible fixed assets 
 
11.63 47.12 41.83 47.44 
Leverage / total assets 
 
68.92 48.68 57.70 60.11 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets 
 
42.44 33.43 35.67 34.42 
Sales/nb. of employees 
 
66.85  165.76 137.19 119.69 
Export 
 
12.14 67.33 22.40 14.86 
Observations 
 
104,520 154,395 650,475 121,705 
 
Notes: Assets and sales are expressed in thousands of yuan. All other variables except age and number 
of employees are expressed in percentage terms. Export is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
exports, and 0 otherwise. All variables were deflated using provincial GDP deflators. See the Appendix 
for complete definitions of all variables.   31
 









































(Cash flow / 









       
       
J (p-value)  0.06 0.05 0.00  0.03 
m2  0.07 -0.54  0.63  1.11 
       
       
Observations 
 
47,067 55,400 159,967  47,759 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and 
test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-2), 
(Cash flow / total assets)i(t-2), and further lags. Time dummies were always included in the instrument set. m2 is a 
test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   32











































































































No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
          
J (p-value)  0.04 0.05 0.002  0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
m2  -0.56 -0.06 -1.71 -0.57  1.82 1.24 0.25 1.18 
          
          
Observations 
 
29,652 47,067 35,875 55,400 95,343 159,967  29,881 47,759 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies were included in all specifications. In columns 2, 4, 6, 
and 8, time dummies interacted with industry dummies were also included. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-2), (Cash flow / total 
assets)i(t-2), and further lags. In columns 1, 3, 5, and 7, (Sales growth)i(t-2) and further lags are also included in the 
instrument set. Time dummies were always included in the instrument set. In columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies were also included in the instrument set. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   33
Table 6: Simple assets growth model augmented with industry-specific time 










































(Cash flow / 










       
J (p-value)  0.60 0.48 0.00  0.15 
m2  -0.37 0.18  0.63  -0.85 
       
       
       
Observations 
 
23,225 36,936 109,634  25,781 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-2), (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-2), and further 
lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument 
set. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed 
as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   34
Table 7: Simple assets growth model augmented with industry-specific time 
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J (p-value)  0.93 0.77 0.00  0.09 
m2  -0.05 0.18  1.09  -1.98 
       
       
       
Observations 
 
26,735 28,785 83,697  17,203 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-2), (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-2), and further 
lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument 
set. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed 
as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   35
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J (p-value)  0.070 0.001 0.00  0.002 
m2 
 
-0.61 -0.84 1.77  1.59 
Observations 
 
47,067 55,400 159,967  47,759 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (Assets growth)i(t-2); (Cash flow / total assets)i(t-2); Leveragei(t-2), 
Collaterali(t-2); (Nb. of employees)i(t-2); (Sales / nb of employees)i(t-2); Exporti(t-2); and further lags. Time dummies 
and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. m2 is a test for 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. Also see Notes to Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 